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A STATE’S DUTY TO PREPARE, WARN, AND 
MITIGATE NATURAL DISASTER DAMAGES 
Jessica Lucia Frattaroli* 
Abstract: The past two decades have brought an onslaught of increasingly 
severe natural disasters. Scientists warn that climate change will continue 
to worsen this phenomenon. Infrastructure has not, and will not, hold up 
to the threats these natural disaster pose. In light of this new global real-
ity, this Note explores what duty a state has to prepare for, warn of, and 
mitigate natural disaster damages. Past disasters have left victims unsatis-
fied with their government’s response to their needs. In 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina left victims in the U.S. Gulf region abandoned for days; in 2008, 
the Myanmar government refused to accept foreign aid after Cyclone 
Nargis swept through the countryside; and in 2009, Italian government 
scientists offered citizens of L’Aquila absolute assurance that they were 
safe to return to their homes, merely days before a 6.3 magnitude earth-
quake devastated the region. The extent of a state’s duty, as well as access 
to relief, have left victims with tremendous uncertainty. Even with these 
hurdles and in light of the overwhelming practical and policy concerns, 
the needs of victims might be best satisfied outside the context of litiga-
tion. 
Introduction 
 “The destruction came in all forms: Wind, water, snow and fire” 
and the East Coast of the United States was not prepared for its magni-
tude.1 On Sunday October 28, 2012, Hurricane Sandy surged north-
eastward off the North Carolina coast.2 While rain and wind ravaged 
the Carolinas, Virginia, and Maryland, forecasters warned that by the 
next morning the hurricane would wrap around a cold front, creating a 
                                                                                                                      
* Jessica Frattaroli is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Wayne Drash, Wind, Rain, Snow and Fire: The Storm That Broke Records—and Hearts, CNN 
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/04/us/sandy-survivors-victims-narrative; see 
Clark A. Miller, Will Politicians Actually Heed the Lessons of Sandy?, Slate (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/11/hurricane_sandy_dem
onstrated_that_our_infrastructure_is_not_ready_for_climate.html. 
2 Drash, supra note 1. 
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“superstorm” as it hit New Jersey and New York.3 The forecasters were 
right.4 
 This “900-mile-wide monster” storm killed 132 Americans, dam-
aged or destroyed tens of thousands of homes, left more than 8 million 
people without power, and immobilized the nation’s principal metro-
politan area.5 Severe wind, massive flooding, and breakout fires caused 
upwards of $50 billion in damage.6 In the month before Hurricane 
Sandy, the U.S. government came dangerously close to losing its ability 
to track and warn of the storm’s progress when one of its major satel-
lites stopped working.7 U.S. infrastructure was unprepared to handle 
the storm’s enormity, and many victims criticized the government’s 
ability to respond effectively to their needs.8 
 Forecasters dubbed Hurricane Sandy a “Frankenstorm,” but ex-
perts agree that Hurricane Sandy was no freak-storm.9 Rather, it fore-
shadowed a future where citizens will fight to survive killer weather.10 
States across the United States and countries around the world have 
seen a recent surge in severe and deadly natural occurrences.11 Scien-
tists warn that climate change has caused this phenomenon.12 Studies 
show that infrastructure has not and will not hold up, and countries 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 Id.; Stephen E. Flynn, America Isn’t Ready for Superstorms, CNN ( Jan. 6, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/06/opinion/flynn-storms-preparation/index.html; Tim 
Lister, Experts Warn of Superstorm Era to Come, CNN (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.cnn. 
com/2012/10/31/us/sandy-climate-change/index.html. 
6 Drash, supra note 1; see Lisa L. Colangelo, et al., Hurricane Sandy: Fire in Breezy Point 
Burns Down More Than 80 Homes, Residents Devastated, N.Y. Daily News (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens/breezy-point-dev 
astated-80-homes-burn-article-1.1194973. 
7 Tricia Escobedo, Science, Satellites and Superstorms, Preparing for the Next Big One, CNN 
( Jan. 7, 2013, 8:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/04/us/us-superstorm-threat. 
8 See Miranda Leitsinger, Red Cross Pushes Back on Sandy Response, Calls It ‘Near Flawless,’ 
NBC News (Nov. 11, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/11/15090950-
red-cross-pushes-back-on-sandy-response-calls-it-near-flawless?lite; Greg B. Smith, New York-
ers Hit Hard by Hurricane Sandy Denied Aid by FEMA Bureaucracy, N.Y. Daily News (Dec. 1, 
2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-yorkers-denied-aid-fema-bureaucracy-
article-1.1211634. 
9 See Lister, supra note 5; Gary Strauss & Doyle Rice, ‘Frankenstorm’ Sandy a Menace to 
East Coast, USA Today (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2012/ 
10/26/hurricane-sandy-frankenstorm/1659907/. 
10 See Lister, supra note 5. 
11 See Int’l Fed’n of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soc’ys, World Disasters Re-
port 2010: Focus on Urban Risk 35 (2010) [hereinafter World Disasters Report]. 
12 Jane Lubchenco, Extreme Weather and a Changing Climate, CNN ( July 24, 2012), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2012/07/24/opinion/lubchenco-climate/index.html. 
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that do not have adequate emergency plans will be unable to cope with 
the devastation.13 
 In light of these now regularly occurring natural disasters, it is un-
clear whether the state has a legal duty to prepare, warn, and mitigate 
natural disaster damages.14 Part I of this Note provides a background 
on the past decade of extreme weather, with a specific focus on four 
disasters that sparked particular outrage over inadequate preparation, 
warning, and mitigation of damages on the part of the home govern-
ment—Hurricane Sandy and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina in the United 
States, 2008’s Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and the 2009 earthquake in 
L’Aquila, Italy. Part II discusses the principles of a duty to protect, a 
duty that has never been definitively established but that has been ar-
guably created by both past practice and an international call to action 
in the area of climate change. Part II also discusses the domestic hurdle 
of sovereign immunity and the international hurdle of establishing a 
cognizable cause of action if such a duty has been established. Part III 
discusses what existing precedent means for both Hurricane Sandy vic-
tims and for future victims of natural disaster across the globe if their 
national governments do not prepare, warn, and mitigate damages 
adequately. This Note concludes that, given the overwhelming policy 
implications and the availability of post-disaster victim compensation 
funds, bringing natural disaster decisions into the legal realm might 
not create the remedy that many victims anticipate. 
I. Background 
A. Climate Change and Extreme Weather 
 The vast majority of the scientific community believes that the cli-
mate has changed over the last several decades.15 A recent report from 
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
concluded that the first six months of 2012 were the hottest on re-
cord.16 Over the past three decades, about 1.3 million square miles of 
Arctic sea ice have disappeared, leading to rising sea levels.17 The earth 
                                                                                                                      
13 See World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 11; Miller, supra note 1. 
14 Tyra Ruth Saechao, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clar-
ity, 32 Brook. J. Int’l L. 663, 665–66 (2007); Jarrod Wong, Reconstructing the Responsibility to 
Protect in the Wake of Cyclones and Separatism, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 219, 222–23 (2009). 
15 Flynn, supra note 5. 
16 Steven Cohen, Why We Should Expect More Weather Disasters, CNN ( July 12, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/11/opinion/cohen-extreme-weather. 
17 Flynn, supra note 5; Lister, supra note 5. 
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is getting warmer and scientists link this man-made climate change to 
the extreme weather of the past decade.18 “Global warming is making 
Mother Nature more mischievous” and, as a result, extreme weather 
events have become more frequent and more dangerous.19 In a recent 
international study led by the NOAA, scientists investigated seven in-
stances of extreme weather in 2011 and affirmatively linked six of the 
seven to climate change caused by human activities.20 
 This man-made climate change has come at a high cost.21 Natural 
disasters, unprecedented in size and strength, now hit much more of-
ten, and the world has experienced an onslaught in recent years.22 In 
the past decade the global community has endured devastating earth-
quakes and subsequent tsunamis in the South Indian Ocean and Japan; 
massive earthquakes in Iran, Haiti, and Italy; cyclones in Myanmar and 
the United States; and colossal hurricanes such as Hurricane Katrina in 
the Gulf Coast and Hurricane Irene which hit the East Coast a year be-
fore Hurricane Sandy.23 During the year of 2011 alone, fourteen ex-
treme natural occurrences hit the United States, resulting in an exten-
sive loss of life and upwards of $55 billion in monetary damages.24 The 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
estimates that earthquakes killed an average of 50,184 people per year 
from 2000–2008, and that floods affected approximately ninety-nine 
million people per year.25 
 Given this increase in extreme weather, the Disasters Emergency 
Committee, which encompasses thirteen international humanitarian 
aid agencies, warns that the world should prepare for an onslaught of 
urban disasters.26 They anticipate that such disasters will be particularly 
                                                                                                                      
18 Lister, supra note 5; CNN Wire Staff, NASA Scientist Links Climate Change, Extreme 
Weather, CNN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/05/us/climate-change; see 
Lubchenco, supra note 12. 
19 Flynn, supra note 5; Lubchenco, supra note 12. 
20 Lubchenco, supra note 12. 
21 See World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 11. 
22 Lister, supra note 5. 
23 See World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 11; Eric Holthaus, Sandy vs. Irene, How 
Do the Storms Stack Up?, Wall St. J. (Oct. 28, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/ 
2012/10/28/hurricane-sandy-vs-irene-how-do-big-storms-stack-up/; Tom Kington, L’Aquila’s 
Earthquake-Scarred Streets See Battle Between Science and Politics, Guardian (Oct. 27, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/27/laquila-earthquake-battle-science- 
politics; Claire Provost, A Decade of Disasters, Guardian (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/global-development/datablog/2011/mar/18/world-disasters-earthquake-
data. 
24 Lubchenco, supra note 12. 
25 Provost, supra note 23. 
26 Id. 
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devastating for the 950 million people who live in urban slums world-
wide.27 The U.N. Internal Displacement Monitoring System reiterates 
this finding and reports that these natural disasters will have a greater 
impact than ever before because the population of the earth has 
swelled to 7 billion people.28 The current infrastructure of cities is ill 
equipped to adapt to the huge increase in population density.29 
B. Unparalleled Disaster Strikes and Survivors Are Left with Questions--- 
Hurricane Katrina, Cyclone Nargis, & a 6.3 Magnitude  
Earthquake in L’Aquila 
 The past decade has had no shortage of devastating natural disas-
ters.30 Four in particular have raised serious debate about a govern-
ment’s duty to prepare, warn, and mitigate natural disaster damages.31 
Hurricane Katrina devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, Cyclone 
Nargis swept through Myanmar in 2008, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake 
shook L’Aquila Italy in 2009, and Hurricane Sandy crippled the U.S. 
East Coast in 2012.32 In the aftermath of each natural disaster, affected 
citizens raised serious questions about their home nation’s actions.33 
1. Hurricane Katrina Devastates the U.S. Gulf Coast 
 On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf 
Coast of the United States killing 1,833 people, affecting 500,000 peo-
ple, and costing $125 million in damage.34 This category 3 storm swept 
into the coast with 145 mile per hour winds that wiped out the power to 
more than one million people.35 Overwhelming rain and a huge tidal 
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. 
28 Cohen, supra note 16. 
29 Id. 
30 World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 39. 
31 See Faith J. Jackson, A Streetcar Named Negligence in a City Called New Orleans—A Duty 
Owed, a Duty Breached, a Sovereign Shield, 31 T. Marshall L. Rev 557, 563 (2006); Wong, 
supra note 14, at 243; John Hooper, Italian Scientists Convicted for ‘False Assurances’ Before 
Earthquake, Guardian (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2012/oct/22/italian-scientists-jailed-earthquake-aquila; Vincent Laforet, Hurricane Katrina, 
N.Y. Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/h/hurricane_ 
katrina/index.html (last updated Sep. 25, 2012). 
32 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 563; Wong, supra note 14, at 221; Hooper, supra note 
31; Laforet, supra note 31. 
33 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 561–62; Wong, supra note 14, at 242–46; Laforet, supra 
note 31; Hooper, supra note 31. 
34 World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 39; Laforet, supra note 31. 
35 Laforet, supra note 31. 
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surge submerged highways, houses, and whole neighborhoods.36 The 
hurricane’s twenty-nine-foot storm surge was the highest ever measured 
in the United States and New Orleans’ levees could not handle the 
pressure.37 Hundreds of thousands of evacuees were forced to leave, 
some were rescued on their rooftops, and others were brought to the 
New Orleans Superdome Stadium to await permanent relocation.38 
Those seeking refuge in the Superdome experienced violence, crime, 
and subhuman conditions.39 
 In the days after the storm, victims voiced frustration with the state 
and federal governments’ lack of preparation and slow response to 
help those in need.40 Experts agree that the “flood protection system in 
New Orleans was flawed from the start.”41 The U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers built the levees to stand up to a model storm that was too sim-
plistic.42 This shortcoming led to a vulnerable system of levees, flood-
walls, storm gates, and pumps.43 After the infrastructure failed, victims 
viewed President George W. Bush’s emergency response as “too little 
and too late.”44 Many citizens claim that the government did not re-
spond with equal attention to the poorer sections of the city.45 
 In the aftermath of the backlash and criticism, the head of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Michael Brown, was 
relieved of his post amid fears within the Bush administration that its 
delayed response to the disaster would affect the administration’s im-
age.46 Even so, victims were not satisfied and sought legal remedies.47 
In November 2009, a federal district court judge ruled in favor of a 
group of victims who brought claims against the federal government 
for poor maintenance of the Mississippi River by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, whose alleged negligence led to some of the worst flooding 
                                                                                                                      
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See id.; Kim Murphy, Recalling Days of Despair in the Superdome, L.A. Times (Aug. 30, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/30/nation/la-na-0830-katrina-superdome-
20100830. 
39 Laforet, supra note 31. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Tarak Anada, The Perfect Storm, an Imperfect Response, and a Sovereign Shield: Can 
Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 
279, 282 (2008). 
46 Laforet, supra note 31. 
47 See id. 
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after the hurricane.48 In September 2012, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals partially upheld the judgment.49 Specifically, the court held 
that the government could not claim immunity under the Flood Con-
trol Act on certain claims but could do so on those related to the levee 
breaches.50 The city of New Orleans has subsequently installed a $14.5 
billion levee system.51 This system, like its predecessor, will not stand up 
to a Category 1 storm with surges of ten to fourteen feet.52 
2. Cyclone Nargis Sweeps Through Myanmar 
 On May 2, 2008, cyclone Nargis hit southern Myanmar,53 killing 
138,366 people, affecting 2,420,000 people and causing $4 billion in 
damage.54 The damage came in waves.55 It started when a twelve-foot-
high storm surge swept across the Irrawaddy Delta, immediately killing 
tens of thousands of people, and flooding the villages in its path.56 Aid 
arrived almost immediately from the United States, France, and Britain, 
but the Myanmar government refused to allow foreign helicopters or 
ships to enter the country.57 On June 4, 2008, the Pentagon’s Pacific 
Command announced that the Navy’s aid ships would turn back after 
nearly three weeks of waiting off the coast of Myanmar to deliver aid.58 
During those three weeks, the U.S. Navy made at least fifteen attempts 
to deliver essential and life-saving resources, but the Myanmar govern-
ment turned them away each time.59 
                                                                                                                      
48 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 644 (E.D. 
La. 2009) [hereinafter Katrina I]. 
49 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 436 (5th Cir. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Katrina II]. 
50 See id. 
51 Laforet, supra note 31. 
52 Id. 
53 Burmese Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, N.Y. Times (June 18, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/world/asia/18myanmar.html?ref=cyclonenargis. 
54 See World Disasters Report, supra note 11, at 35. 
55 Stuart Ford, Is the Failure to Respond Appropriately to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against 
Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis, 38 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 227, 227–28 (2010). 
56 Id. 
57 Burmese Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, supra note 53. 
58 Thom Shanker, Myanmar: Navy Ships to Leave, N.Y. Times ( June 4, 2008), 
http://www.query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E2DB123FF937A35755C0A96
E9C8B63. 
59 Id. 
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 The twenty-foot waves devastated the land.60 Nearly 14,000 survi-
vors, who had no homes, families, or livelihoods to return to, sought 
shelter in nearby monasteries.61 Nevertheless, within weeks the military 
evicted these survivors from monasteries and refugee camps, and 
forced them to return to the destroyed delta to start reconstruction.62 
Junta leader Senior General Than Shwe, assured the United Nations 
that he would relax his exclusion of foreign aid in order to mitigate the 
suffering endured by survivors.63 In fact, the State-run media even spot-
lighted and praised Shwe as he visited refugee camps and compared his 
compassion to “parents’ loving kindness and good will toward their off-
spring.”64 In reality, however, the junta coordinated no such mitiga-
tion.65 
 Relief workers and the international community criticized Myan-
mar’s refusal to accept foreign aid, the State’s secretive behavior in re-
sponse to calls for foreign assistance, and the government’s “obsession 
with security” which resulted in severe restrictions on who was allowed 
into the country.66 Citizens, domestic humanitarian agencies, and 
Burmese monks were left abandoned.67 The need for pressing, life-
saving aid was less than may be expected given the nature of the cy-
clone, which either killed people immediately or left them un-
injured.68 Because survivors of the cyclone were largely physically un-
harmed, villages endured without aid for weeks after the cyclone hit.69 
Most of the survivors lived off of coconuts, rotten rice, and rotten fish.70 
In light of the junta’s lack of response and refusal to accept foreign aid, 
the United States accused the government of “criminal neglect”.71 Aid 
workers and citizens in Myanmar privately supported this sentiment, 
although not many dared to speak out publicly.72 The country’s mili-
tary leadership did not tolerate criticism and even sentenced a Bur-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Myanmar Junta Begins Evicting Cyclone Victims from Shelters, N.Y. Times ( June 7, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/world/asia/07delta.html?pagewanted=all. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 Burmese Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, supra note 53. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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mese comedian to more than forty-five years in prison for his outspo-
ken criticism of the regime’s response to the devastation.73 
 Political theorists believe that Myanmar’s military generals feared 
invasion from western countries.74 Others from the international com-
munity felt that the Burmese government did not address the devasta-
tion because they feared it would disrupt a vote on the upcoming con-
stitutional referendum that would shift power to the military, which 
had been scheduled for May 10, 2008.75 Some believed that the gov-
ernment refused aid because ethnic minorities, who were historically 
hostile to the military regime, occupied the areas hit hardest by the cy-
clone.76 Whatever the reasons, international humanitarian agencies 
and scholars have questioned whether this refusal of aid amounts to a 
crime against Myanmar’s own people under international law.77 
3. A 6.3 Magnitude Earthquake Shakes L’Aquila, Italy 
 On April 6, 2009, a major 6.3 magnitude earthquake devastated 
the medieval town of L’Aquila in the Italian region of Abruzzo, killing 
more than 300 people and affecting thousands of others.78 It nearly 
flattened L’Aquila’s historic center, injured upwards of 1,000 people, 
and left tens of thousands homeless.79 
 In the months before the earthquake hit, the region experienced 
some 400 tremors, and hundreds of concerned citizens chose to sleep 
outside in fear for their lives.80 In the wake of this public panic, Italy’s 
Commissione Nazionale dei Grandi Rischi sent a group of seven experts to 
evaluate the data surrounding the tremors and advise citizens on the 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Sharon Otterman, Myanmar Gives Comedian 45-Year Sentence for Cyclone Comments, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A6. 
74 Joseph Zeitlyn, Life After Nargis, Himal South Asian ( June 2009), available at http:// 
www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/524-life-after-nargis.html. 
75 Wong, supra note 14, at 243 (citing Voting Proceeds in Myanmar Despite Cyclone’s Devas-
tation, L.A. Times, May 11, 2008, at A11). 
76 Id. (citing Tim Heinemann, Op-Ed, A Sinister Sweep: Myanmar Uses Cyclone to Push Out 
Ethnic Minorities, Chi. Trib., May 30, 2008, at C25). 
77 Ford, supra note 55, at 227; Wong, supra note 14, at 219. 
78 Hooper, supra note 31; Elisabetta Povoledo & Henry Fountain, Italy Orders Jail Terms 
for 7 Who Didn’t Warn of Deadly Earthquake, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2012, at A4; see also Alberto 
Sisto, Scientists Sentenced to 6 Years in Jail for Quake Warning Failure, MSNBC (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/49504719/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/scientists-
sentenced-years-jail-quake-warning-failure/#.UUt-H1vwJIg. 
79 Hooper, supra note 31. 
80 Kington, supra note 23; Hooper, supra note 31; David Ropeik, The L’Aquila Verdict: A 
Judgment Not Against Science, but Against a Failure of Science Communication, Scientific Am. 
(Oct. 22, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/10/22/the-laquila-
verdict-a-judgment-not-against-science-but-against-a-failure-of-science-communication/. 
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status of their safety.81 The experts met for several hours, and agreed 
that the tremors could not help predict whether there would be a ma-
jor earthquake.82 They then left town without speaking to citizens at 
all.83 
 Scientist Guido Bertolaso arranged a community meeting on 
March 31, 2009, but did not attend.84 Instead, a local official reported 
to those present that “the scientific community tells us there is no dan-
ger, because there is an ongoing discharge of energy. The situation 
looks favourable.”85 Dr. Bernardo De Bernardinis, Deputy Chief of It-
aly’s Civil Protection Department, even told people to go have a glass of 
wine.86 Those sleeping outside were encouraged to go back into their 
homes because they would be safe.87 Bertolaso, under investigation for 
corruption at the time of the meeting, was even recorded during a 
telephone call telling a local official that the meeting was simply a “me-
dia event” to “quiet the imbiciles” who feared a massive earthquake.88 
 Survivor Vincenzo Vittorini recalled his experience at the March 
meeting, relating that “[d]uring a tremor the day before the meeting, 
everyone in L'Aquila had run for the streets, but on the night of the 
fifth, after the meeting, we felt the initial tremors, said ‘this is good, the 
more the merrier’, and went to bed.”89 The next morning, he, his wife, 
and his daughter fell through the floor as their house crumbled and he 
was pinned down as he heard both his wife and daughter die.90 
 In the aftermath of this disaster, six scientists and one government 
official were criminally charged with homicide for giving allegedly “in-
complete, imprecise and contradictory information” about the danger 
at the March 31, 2009 meeting.91 In his closing argument, prosecutor 
Fabio Picuti even cited U.S. litigation surrounding the Army Corps’ 
alleged negligence in association with the Hurricane Katrina flooding, 
arguing the case set a precedent where the government was responsible 
for falling short of predicting and preventing risk in the wake of natural 
                                                                                                                      
81 Hooper, supra note 31; Kington, supra note 23; Ropeik, supra note 80. 
82 Hooper, supra note 31. 
83 Id. 
84 Kington, supra note 23. 
85 Hooper, supra note 31. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Kington, supra note 23. 
90 Id. 
91 Sisto, supra note 78 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disaster.92 On October 22, 2012, these men were convicted of man-
slaughter in the L’Aquila court and sentenced to six years in prison.93 
 Although victims of the earthquake and their families seemed sat-
isfied, the global scientific community erupted with outrage over the 
verdict.94 Scientists warned that they will be reluctant to offer advice on 
such uncertain things as the risk of natural disasters, and many Italian 
government scientists resigned in protest.95 Given the limits of scientific 
certainty, they believed that the job of scientists was to help assess risks 
but not to be held accountable for the uncertainties of nature.96 
4. Hurricane Sandy Cripples the U.S. East Coast 
 In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the governors of New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut estimate that the damage from Hurricane 
Sandy, apart from the cost in human life, will total $82 billion.97 New 
York City's subway system suffered the most extensive damage in its 108-
year history, the New York Stock Exchange closed for two consecutive 
days, and the surf in the New York Harbor reached a record 32.5 feet.98 
Many believe that this damage could have been reduced if the East 
Coast had been better prepared.99 In 2007, the American Society of 
Civil Engineers evaluated New Jersey’s infrastructure, and gave it an 
overall grade of C-.100 In 2010, a study of New York’s infrastructure per-
formed by Guy Nordenson, an architect and structural engineer, con-
cluded that the city was unprepared for the storm surge and wave ac-
                                                                                                                      
92 Povoledo & Fountain, supra note 78. 
93 Sisto, supra note 78. 
94 See Hooper, supra note 31; Kington, supra note 23; Ropeik, supra note 80; Sisto, supra 
note 78. 
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tion that came with a major storm.101 Experts recommended building 
higher sea walls, preparing the subway system for flooding by raising 
entrances, building barrier islands, restoring oyster beds, and installing 
gates across estuaries.102 
 One of the government’s major successes in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy was their ability to predict the enormity of the storm, but that 
ability nearly collapsed before the storm hit.103 A month before Hurri-
cane Sandy hit the East Coast, the powerful geostationary satellite that 
monitors the Caribbean and Atlantic oceans, stopped working.104 Luck-
ily, the NOAA had a backup satellite to “scramble into place.”105 With-
out this backup satellite, forecasters would have been blind to the im-
pending storm.106 Nevertheless, in an “era of shrinking budgets,” 
meteorologists are worried that the same backup satellites might not be 
available for the next storm.107 
 In the days after the storm, many criticized the emergency action 
plans, access to emergency resources, and restoration of power and 
functionality.108 Two months after Hurricane Sandy made landfall near 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, the new 113th Congress approved a $9.7 bil-
lion storm relief measure, and then a $60.4 billion federal aid pack-
age.109 This federal aid did not come swiftly, and many citizens, includ-
ing New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, criticized Congress and the 
Speaker of the House for not delivering faster federal aid.110 
II. Discussion 
 Victims of these four natural disasters in particular are largely dis-
satisfied with their home government’s preparation, warning, and miti-
gation of damages.111 Although it is arguable that a duty to protect has 
been established by past domestic practice, international human rights 
law, and an international call-to-action in the area of global warming, it 
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is unclear whether such precedent amounts to a legally recognized 
duty.112 Furthermore, there are substantial obstacles in the way of get-
ting such a claim into a court in the first place, be it international or 
domestic, civil or criminal.113 Victims who might seek relief in interna-
tional courts face the hurdles of standing, the difficulty of establishing a 
realistic cause of action, and the reality that States might be reluctant to 
infringe on another’s sovereignty.114 Victims seeking domestic remedies 
in the United States must contend with the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, the discretionary function exception to government liability, 
and the lack of both a viable criminal charge or standing to bring ac-
tions in criminal court.115 
A. Duty and Remedy Under International Law 
1. A Duty Under International Human Rights Law and Precedent 
 The international global community has established a pattern and 
practice of coming to one another’s aid in the wake of natural disaster, 
both with monetary assistance and on-the-ground humanitarian aid.116 
Individual countries have also established a pattern and practice of 
preparing themselves and coming to the aid of their citizens once natu-
ral disasters strike.117 Nevertheless, it is not clear if this pattern of action 
has coalesced into customary international law because no country has 
yet been held liable under this theory in either an international civil or 
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criminal proceeding.118 Instead, legal scholars and disaster victims have 
tried to equate the duty to protect from natural disaster with recog-
nized State duties under international human rights law.119 
 The foundation for international human rights law comes from a 
number of different sources.120 First, the United Nations Charter man-
dates that Member States take joint and separate action to protect hu-
man rights.121 The 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
confirms this pledge.122 When the U.N. Charter and Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights are combined with the U.N. Human Rights 
Covenants of 1966, they comprise an International Bill of Human 
Rights.123 Scholars argue that these non-binding resolutions amount to 
customary international law, and therefore a binding legal obligation to 
provide security to one’s citizens.124 These articles expanded upon this 
duty, clarifying that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe and outline a responsibil-
ity to prevent man-made crises, react to situations of human need, and 
rebuild harmed areas.”125 Secondly, in the Corfu Channel Case of 1949, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized that international 
obligations towards humanity exist during times of peace.126 
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 The most recent addition to the custom of international human 
rights law was codified in 2005 at the U.N. Sixtieth Anniversary World 
Summit.127 The groundbreaking doctrine, the responsibility to protect, 
provides that when sovereign governments manifestly fail to discharge 
their primary responsibility to protect their populations from “genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” that respon-
sibility then falls on the wider global community.128 This national duty 
includes a responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild.129 The doctrine’s 
drafters intended to address recent instances of genocide and thus de-
liberately excluded natural disasters from the doctrine’s scope.130 None-
theless, many observers speculate that this compromise served to pacify 
smaller countries concerned for the safety of their sovereignty going 
forward.131 
2. An Arguable Duty Created by the 1992 United Nations “Earth 
Summit” and 1997 Kyoto Protocols 
 By 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
a multinational scientific agency under the control of the United Na-
tions, released a report concerning the status of climate change.132 The 
IPCC concluded, “emissions resulting from human activities are sub-
stantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of . . . greenhouse 
gases [which] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average 
in an additional warming of the Earth's surface.”133 In response to this 
report, the United Nations organized the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio 
de Janeiro.134 
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 The “Earth Summit” sought to help governments “rethink eco-
nomic development and find ways to halt the destruction of irreplace-
able natural resources and pollution of the planet.”135 The two-week 
Earth Summit was the synthesis of a plan initiated in December 1989 to 
bring U.N. Member States together to adopt “a wide-ranging blueprint 
for action to achieve sustainable development worldwide.”136 The con-
vention led to the adoption of Agenda 21, a broad plan for action to 
achieve sustainable development across the globe.137 The United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a non-
binding agreement between 154 States, aims to reduce greenhouse gas-
ses and their dangerous effect on the earth’s climate.138 
 This summit influenced all subsequent U.N. conferences, which 
have paid particularly close attention to “the relationship between hu-
man rights, population, social development, women and human set-
tlements—and the need for environmentally sustainable develop-
ment.”139 For instance, the World Conference on Human Rights, held 
in Vienna in 1993, discussed the right of citizens “to a healthy environ-
ment and the right to development, controversial demands that had 
met with resistance from some Member States until Rio.”140 Principle 
13 of the Earth Summit states: 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and com-
pensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and 
more determined manner to develop further international law 
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of en-
vironmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.141 
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 Five years later, in June 1997, the United Nations organized the 
Rio+5 Special Session in New York.142 At the meeting, a joint declara-
tion was issued by Germany, Brazil, South Africa and Singapore to take 
up the work left to be done on Article 21 which proposed that the U.N. 
Charter should be amended to incorporate and include sustainable 
development and environmental protection as two of the United Na-
tions’ purposes.143 By elevating it to such an important status and creat-
ing a new umbrella organization to combat environmental issues, these 
four nations sought to propel the achievement of Article 21.144 
 That same year, the United Nations officially followed up on the 
Earth Summit with a meeting for all UNFCCC signatories in Kyoto, Ja-
pan.145 During this meeting, States created mandatory numerical tar-
gets for industrialized nations to reach in their attempt to reduce their 
own State’s greenhouse gas emissions.146 These guidelines demand that 
developed nations decrease their emissions of six designated categories 
of greenhouse gasses to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012, and re-
quire that “demonstrable progress” be achieved by 2005.147 The Kyoto 
Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005 when Russia joined 
171 other states in ratifying the agreement.148 
3. The Hurdles to International Causes of Action & International 
Courts 
 Even if a duty is established, there are significant standing and 
procedural accessibility issues that vary widely depending on the court 
where a claim is brought, all of which must be navigated when consid-
ering relief through international law.149 There are also strong policy 
implications of such action.150 State sovereignty mandates that each 
country has a fundamental right to control affairs in its own territory 
and that affect its own citizens.151 The new, modern interpretation of 
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State sovereignty incorporates the idea that this status is dependent 
upon the States’ recognition of obligations to their people.152 
 Further, in the criminal context, only the Office of the Prosecutor 
has the authority to bring criminal charges in the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC), or another criminal tribunal.153 The criminal cause of 
action for “crimes against humanity” is codified in Article 7(1) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and requires that 
there be a widespread, systematic attack directed against a civilian popu-
lation.154 It is within the discretion of the Office of the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation and bring charges, although it will respond to 
requests by nations to investigate in certain circumstances.155 
 Despite these hurdles, a path has been paved.156 In Nicaragua v. 
U.S., the ICJ held that “[t]here can be no doubt that the provision of 
strictly humanitarian aid [such as food, clothing, and medicine] to per-
sons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or 
objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any 
other way contrary to international law.”157 In its opinion, the ICJ 
found this duty imperative in order to “prevent and alleviate human 
suffering,” “to protect life and health,” and to “ensure respect for the 
human being,” and that this obligation was to be given “without dis-
crimination” to all in need.158 Given this holding, observers have in-
ferred that the ICJ requires the same relief for natural disaster victims, 
provided that the aid offered is for purely humane purposes.159 
  This doctrine of a duty to protect from natural disaster, while not 
addressed directly, relies on an established premise that states are re-
sponsible not only for their own action, but also for the protection of 
their citizens from private action that affects human rights.160 For ex-
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ample, in Budayeva v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights 
found that Russia had not implemented policies and protective meas-
ures to shield inhabitants of a region prone to deadly mudslides because 
the government had not maintained dams or observation posts to pro-
vide timely warnings.161 The court found that Russia failed to “discharge 
the positive obligation to establish a legislative and administrative frame-
work designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the 
right to life as required by Article 2” of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and therefore they had violated the Convention.162 
B. Duty and Remedy Under U.S. Domestic Law 
1. A Duty to Protect Under U.S. Domestic law 
 In order to establish that the U.S. government breached its duty to 
protect, it must first be established that the U.S. government does in 
fact have an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from natural disas-
ter.163 On Thursday September 15, 2005, President George W. Bush 
articulated this duty in a speech he made from Jackson Square in the 
French Quarter of New Orleans seventeen days after Hurricane Katrina 
hit the Gulf Coast: 
The government of this nation will do its part as well. Our cit-
ies must have clear and up-to-date plans for responding to 
natural disasters, disease outbreaks or terrorist attack[s]—for 
evacuating large numbers of people in an emergency and for 
providing the food, water and security they would need . . . . 
Yet the system at every level of government, was not well co-
ordinated and was overwhelmed in the first few days. It is now 
clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal au-
thority and a broader role for the armed forces—the institu-
tion of our government most capable of massive logistical op-
erations on a moment’s notice.164 
 The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution also seems to establish such 
a duty to the citizens of the United States.165 The promises to “insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, [and] promote 
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the general Welfare” are thought by many scholars to include a duty to 
protect from natural disasters.166 In fact, throughout the country’s his-
tory, both federal and state governments have acted to protect their 
citizens in the wake of natural disasters, from earthquakes and tsunamis 
to hurricanes and mudslides.167 A significant amount of annual state 
and federal budgetary money and resources fund police departments, 
fire departments, and emergency services from FEMA to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security.168 
2. Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in the United States and the 
Discretionary Function Exception to Liability 
 Even if a duty to protect is established, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity stands in the way of any victims looking to bring suit.169 The 
United States inherited this doctrine from English law, which estab-
lished the idea that “the King can do no wrong.”170 Justice Holmes ex-
plained the doctrine as a practical conclusion drawn from the idea that 
the sovereign creates the law and is therefore “exempt from suit, not 
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical 
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the au-
thority that makes the law on which the right depends.”171 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has “unquestionably” found that sovereign immunity, 
particularly for state governments, is a constitutional requirement.172 
 Sovereign immunity is discussed in two places in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.173 Article III, section 2 provides original jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court for cases involving controversies to which the United 
States is a party.174 The extension of Sovereign Immunity to the states is 
addressed in the Eleventh Amendment.175 The federal government is 
therefore immune from tort liability without its consent, and it did not 
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give its consent until the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1949, which carved 
out an exception to the doctrine under certain circumstances.176 
 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is the principal legislation by 
which the federal government has waived its insulation from liability 
under sovereign immunity.177 This act makes the federal government 
liable for actions against a government employee acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, unless the person’s decision was a 
“discretionary function” of his or her job.178 The government still has 
immunity when the decision was discretionary, and the Supreme Court 
in Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States developed a two-pronged test 
for determining what is “discretionary.”179 First, a court must decide 
whether the contested governmental action involved an element of 
judgment by the government actor, and second, the judgment must be 
the type of decision the discretionary function doctrine was designed to 
shield.180 The Flood Control Act of 1928 also creates immunity for 
damage from or by floods or floodwaters at any place.181 Nevertheless, 
in United States v. James, the court discussed the possibility of finding an 
exception to this immunity depending on the specific action.182 
 The Constitution does not expressly mention guidelines for times 
of national crisis or environmental disaster.183 The Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act of 1988, however, empowers the gov-
ernment to provide for the “provision of health and safety measures” 
and the “management, control, and reduction of immediate threats to 
public health and safety.”184 The Act outlines the procedures and poli-
cies for coordinating emergency response at the federal and local level, 
as well as the rights of the governments in such emergencies.185 
 In the aftermath of natural disasters in the United States—from 
hurricanes to volcanoes—citizens have tried to bring suit against the 
government for their actions in the wake of the disaster, but the discre-
tionary function doctrine has barred their success.186 In the 1992 case 
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Cougar Business Owners Association v. Washington, the Washington Su-
preme Court found that it was discretionary when the state of Washing-
ton declared a volcanic state of emergency and included the town in 
question as part of the “restricted zone.”187 The suit was brought 
against the State of Washington and its governor for prematurely de-
claring a volcanic emergency, for including a particular town in the 
“red zone” that should not have been included, and for failing to cor-
rect the designation in a timely manner.188 Even if an action does not 
fall under the non-discretionary exception to sovereign immunity, 
courts have still allowed citizens to sue the government in cases of con-
stitutional violations.189 Four years earlier, the Washington Supreme 
Court made a similar determination in Karr v. State of Washington, a 
wrongful death suit brought by the administrator of the decedent’s es-
tate after she was killed in the eruption of Mount St. Helens.190 The 
court concluded that it was within the discretionary function of the 
state to implement safety zones that closed certain areas around Mount 
St. Helens in the wake of the danger.191 
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C. Legal Remedies Sought in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Cyclone 
Nargis, and the L’Aquila Earthquake 
1. Hurricane Katrina Victims: Civil Negligence, an Alleged Violation of 
Equal Protection, and an Alleged Crime Against Humanity 
 Three potential legal claims were proposed in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.192 The first were a series of civil actions raised in 
response to the U.S. government’s failure to adequately prepare in 
terms of flood control and navigation.193 The second were equal pro-
tection violations on the part of citizens in the poorer areas of New Or-
leans, including those forced into the Superdome, because they were 
not able to evacuate.194 The third, purely speculative, legal claims were 
that the government’s actions equated to a crime against humanity un-
der international law.195 
 Domestic civil claims have been the most viable in the post-Katrina 
legal landscape.196 In November 2009, Judge Stanwood Duval, Jr. held 
that the Army Corps of Engineers was liable for poor maintenance of a 
major navigation channel, namely the Mississippi River.197 Four years 
after the storm, this ruling “vindicated” the long-held belief by the citi-
zens of the Gulf area that the flooding was far more than an act of 
God.198 Though the government is generally immune from flooding 
claims, the court held that the resulting damage resulted from prob-
lems with navigational preparation and not flood control measures.199 
 Judge Duval found that the purpose of the Corps’ actions was to 
facilitate navigation and not prepare for flooding and that this purpose 
did not fall within the scope of the Flood Protection Act’s immunity.200 
The government appealed the decision, and in September 2012, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the government could 
not claim immunity under the Flood Control Act on claims relating to 
the dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, but was immune un-
der the same act for levee breaches caused by the dredging of the ca-
nal.201 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the government was liable for 
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some of the flooding.202 The court said, “on account of flood-control 
activity or negligence therein . . . Some Hurricane Katrina-related 
flooding was caused not by flood-control activity (or negligence 
therein) but by MRGO, a navigational channel whose design, construc-
tion, and maintenance cannot be characterized as flood-control activity. 
Therefore, the FCA does not immunize the government against liability 
for that flooding.”203 
 Other plaintiffs have not been able to navigate around sovereign 
immunity.204 In Freeman v. U.S., relatives and representatives of Hurri-
cane Katrina victims filed suit against the United States for wrongful 
death.205 They claimed that the government acted negligently in failing 
to perform nondiscretionary duties arising under the National Re-
sponse Plan (NRP) in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.206 The de-
cedents had decided to stay in their homes as the storm approached 
due to their impaired mobility.207 Two of the decedents were eventually 
evacuated to a convention center after being abandoned and injured in 
their flooded homes for days.208 The convention center was not 
equipped with food, water, medical assistance, triage or transporta-
tion.209 Their families attempted to get them help but they died at the 
convention center untreated.210 Plaintiffs alleged that the terrible con-
ditions in the convention center were not the result of the discretionary 
exception, but instead the result a lack of action on behalf of the gov-
ernment in carrying out the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex.211 
Nevertheless, the court disagreed and dismissed the case on the 
grounds that the NRP, and other authorities leave policy-related choices 
and judgments under these guidelines to those involved in federal 
agencies.212 The decision was therefore discretionary in nature.213 
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, courts have also held that 
the use and management of government funds in the wake of disaster 
management and preparation is discretionary.214 In St. Tammany Parish 
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v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, plaintiffs brought an action 
against FEMA for its decision not to provide full funding for debris re-
moval from private canals following Hurricane Katrina.215 The court 
found that the government had not waived its sovereign immunity un-
der the Stafford Act because the decision about how to allocate money 
and resources was a discretionary function.216 Such a precedent has 
major implications for victims seeking to bring suit under the claim 
that the government did not use their funds in a way to adequately pro-
tect or mitigate damages.217 
 Next, legal scholars have voiced the possibility of bringing equal 
protection claims against the federal government, specifically alleging 
that the poorest of New Orleans’ residents were not offered the same 
protection and help after the storm as other residents.218 One scholar 
compares the plight of the under-privileged African American popula-
tion in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina hit to the slaves in Pom-
peii before Mount Vesuvius erupted, because both were unable to 
evacuate before the storm hit due to a lack of resources.219 The 9th 
Ward, a neighborhood of New Orleans situated below sea level, was 98 
percent African American and did not have access to the automobiles 
that were crucial to FEMA’s pre-hurricane evacuation plan.220 Those 
left behind were left without help for days.221 When help did finally ar-
rive, survivors were directed to shelters that were unsafe and unsanitary, 
specifically the Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center.222 On 
the morning of August 30, 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services assessed the Superdome as “uninhabitable.”223 
 The third and final theoretical claim is that the U.S. government’s 
actions and failures resulted in a crime against humanity.224 This claim 
would allege that the U.S. government did not adequately prepare and 
warn citizens located in the Golf Coast, did not implement policies to 
protect and mitigate damages after the devastation, and that this inac-
tion caused severe death and injury to Hurricane Katrina victims.225 
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2. Myanmar Victims: An Alleged International Crime Against Humanity 
 After Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, the already dire situation 
deteriorated further as the junta refused to allow foreign aid to reach 
victims, confiscated food shipments from the World Food Program, in-
tercepted U.N. shipments, and turned away planes with foreign aid 
workers and press.226 With foreign aid turned away, French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner voiced the need to implement the respon-
sibility to protect doctrine in order to authorize the delivery of aid over 
the junta's resistance.227 A spokesperson for the World Food Program 
noted that this behavior was “unprecedented in modern humanitarian 
relief efforts.”228 
 Although Myanmar eventually accepted aid, its significant delay 
subjected 2.5 million survivors to hunger, exposure, and disease.229 Al-
though no legal action was taken against the government, many coun-
tries called for military intervention on behalf of Myanmar’s citizens as 
their government refused aid.230 Alongside Foreign Minister 
Kouchner’s call for action through the U.N. responsibility to protect 
doctrine, French ambassador to the U.N., Jean-Maurice Ripert re-
quested that the Security Council call for a humanitarian briefing.231 
Myanmar strenuously opposed any such action by means of the respon-
sibility to protect doctrine.232 Myanmar's top diplomats characterized 
France’s outcries as a “blatant politicization” of a humanitarian crisis, 
and warned that it would set a “dangerous precedent.”233 Myanmar’s 
Charge d'Affaires, Muang Muang, declared that the responsibility to 
protect doctrine “was aimed to prevent genocide, not for use in times of 
natural disasters.”234 
3. Abruzzo Victims: Criminal Manslaughter for Inadequately Warning 
 At the beginning of the homicide trial against six scientists and 
one government official in L’Aquila’s district court in September, 2012, 
Italian prosecutor Fabio Picuti told Nature, “I’m not crazy. I know they 
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can’t predict earthquakes.”235 Judge Giuseppe Romano Gargarella reit-
erated that distinction, saying that the issue was whether or not “the 
defendants ‘gave inexact, incomplete and contradictory informa-
tion.’”236 The crux of the trial did not rest on earthquake prediction 
but risk communication.237 The six scientists sent to evaluate the seis-
mic activity never actually communicated directly with or to the public 
about the possibility of an earthquake.238 Defendant Bernardo De Ber-
nardinis, a government official who was not a seismologist, was the only 
defendant who actually communicated with citizens.239 
 Nevertheless, the court found the defendants guilty of negligent 
homicide in violation of their duties as official ministers of the govern-
ment for giving generic, general, and ineffective information to the 
citizens of L’Aquila at a general meeting held on March 31, 2009.240 In 
finding this liability, the court held the defendants to the standard of a 
model agent, requiring a certain level of diligence in evaluating the risk 
and severity of the danger given their knowledge and technical train-
ing.241 A “model agent” is expected to acquire all knowledge to carry 
out his responsibility, both what he believes to be likely but also every 
possible foreseeable outcome.242 In other words, a “model agent” issu-
ing a warning must not limit himself to the outcome he expects will 
happen, but must warn of all possible outcomes.243 
 A “model agent” must not be judged as a normal man, but as a 
member of a category of “expert men” with a superior duty and knowl-
edge.244 Acting as a group, these defendants engaged in a collective 
culpable action when they failed as a collective agent to adequately 
warn the citizens of L’Aquila about the possible risks of the tremors and 
instead advised them to return to their houses.245 Their general and 
ineffective warnings about the risks to the residents of the region to the 
citizens and mayor of L’Aquila were inconsistent with the behavior of a 
                                                                                                                      
235 Andre Mayer, Italian Quake Ruling Rattles Global Science Community Court Convicts Group 
of Scientists of Manslaughter for Inadequate Quake Information, CBC News (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/10/23/f-earthquake-prediction-italy.html. 
236 Id. 
237 Trib. Di L’Aquila, Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, n. 253/10 R.G.N.R., 25; Mayer, 
supra note 235. 
238 Trib. Di L’Aquila, at 25. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 2, 884. 
241 Id. at 884. 
242 Id. at 885. 
243 See id. at 887–88. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. at 892–93. 
200 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:173 
“model agent.”246 The court concluded by listing civil damages, and 
found the defendants personally and collectively liable for the dam-
ages.247 
III. Analysis 
 Not only did the four natural disasters described above receive in-
ternational attention, but the global community also erupted with out-
spoken reactions to the governmental action or lack thereof.248 Most of 
this attention centered on policy questions relating to finding civil or 
criminal liability in the actions revolving around natural disasters that 
are seemingly out of human control.249 That precedent leaves many 
critics questioning the practical implications of such a precedent and 
debating if a better forum for natural disaster grievances than a court-
room exists, and, if so, whether it is in victim relief and compensation 
funds.250 
 Perhaps national and world leaders will follow in the footsteps of 
human rights and environmental summits by affirmatively declaring 
and voting on fair duties and procedures that they will follow in light of 
the new global reality concerning extreme natural disasters and create 
a legal forum and cause of action for grievances.251 Because experts 
agree that super-storms and extreme natural disasters have become a 
constantly worsening phenomenon, the necessary standard of care also 
seems to be constantly evolving and intensifying.252 When balancing 
practical limits imposed by budgets and human resource capabilities, 
this leaves States in the vulnerable position of having to constantly de-
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vote precious resources to the possibility of worsening disasters while 
real time needs might be neglected by this diversion of funds.253 
A. Can a State Possibly Keep Up with Constantly Worsening Disasters and 
Could Those Resources Be Better Spent on Day-to-Day Needs? 
 In the days after Hurricane Sandy, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo told reporters that, “[a]fter what happened, what has been 
happening in the last few years, I don’t think anyone can sit back any-
more and say ‘Well, I’m shocked at that weather pattern.’”254 Many 
agreed that there was much more that could have been done in the 
wake of Hurricane Sandy.255 Critics have been outspoken in saying that, 
as a nation, the United States should be embracing “proven cost-
effective measures that will reduce the harm that disasters cause and 
bolster the speed in which communities can recover.”256 
 These commentators suggest that there are a number of precau-
tionary measures governments can implement.257 Guy Nordenson, 
working with New York’s Mayor Bloomberg, hopes to execute a project 
with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to begin using 
dredged material for natural barriers.258 In addition, experts have 
drafted plans to prepare backup options if ocean saltwater brought by 
these massive storms ruins drinking water.259 They have also developed 
plans to raise subway entrances and reinforce lower floors of build-
ings.260 
 Many of these plans have been tried previously, but did not provide 
the intended result.261 On the seventh anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, the newly reinforced, post-Katrina New Orleans infrastructure 
was put to the test as Tropical Storm Isaac roared into the Gulf Coast.262  
New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu told reporters that, “[t]here is 
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nothing this storm will bring us that we are not capable of handling.”263 
Landrieu assured residents that the levees had $10 billion in improve-
ments since 2005 and that the city's pump stations were equipped with 
backup generators ready in case of electrical outages.264 Mississippi offi-
cials dispatched 1,500 National Guard troops to serve in the state's three 
southern counties in preparation for Hurricane Isaac, and distributed 
10,000 sandbags to residents.265 
 Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant assured citizens that, “[i]n short, 
we have done everything in our power to be prepared for the storm.”266 
If Tropical Storm Isaac was not in fact a tropical storm but rather a 
storm even more powerful than Hurricane Katrina, and if residents 
heeded those warnings and did not adequately evacuate or prepare, 
the question remains to what degree the government should be held 
responsible.267 Given the amount of money New Orleans invested in 
preparations after Hurricane Katrina, policy implications demand a 
consideration of how much further the obligations of a duty to protect 
forces a government to go in order to prepare for constantly worsening 
storms.268 There is also a question of the standard to which poorer 
countries without the resources to adequately prepare should be held. 
 The next consideration is to determine what kinds of damage a 
State is responsible for preparing to mitigate.269 Does every part of the 
country have to prepare for every disaster?270 In June 2011, multiple 
tornadoes ripped through western and central Massachusetts, destroy-
ing urban areas, flipping vehicles and leaving three people dead and 
200 injured.271 At least three tornadoes struck the city of Springfield 
alone, which has more than 150,000 residents.272 These rare Massachu-
setts twisters were created by the arrival of an unstable weather pattern 
hitting the Northeast, causing Philadelphia, New York, and Boston to 
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issue tornado watches.273 The situation in Massachusetts was so danger-
ous that Governor Deval Patrick declared a statewide state of emer-
gency, calling up 1,000 members of the National Guard.274 If Massa-
chusetts usually experiences only occasional weakened hurricanes and 
severe winter weather, it is unclear whether or not it would be held li-
able for failing to adequately prepare for twisters.275 
B. Climate Change, Causation & Prevention 
 Even if duty can be established, the “Act of God” defense still fac-
tors into the legal analysis and causes a problem in proving causation at 
trial.276 In a tort claim, an “Act of God” defense is equivalent to an “in-
tervening force or superseding cause” that breaks the chain of causa-
tion.277 Generally, this defense requires that the event in question was 
not foreseeable by any “reasonable human intelligence” and without 
the contribution of human agency in causing the damages.278 
 An argument can now be made that it is reasonably foreseeable 
that natural disasters will occur with greater frequency and force.279 
Global warming is a man-made phenomenon, but it is almost impossi-
ble to establish causation on an individual level with a natural disas-
ter.280 This gives rise to an inquiry into whether or not victims can sue 
the government for failing to regulate global warming and therefore 
natural disasters.281 If studies can link human action with global warm-
ing and severe weather, perhaps victims could bring action against a 
State for not regulating global warming enough, but also against pol-
luters for causing such dangerous disasters.282 The viability of such a 
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claim is doubtful and critics contend the focus instead should be on 
stopping global warming.283 
 In Cormer v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, a group of prop-
erty owners in Mississippi sued their insurers and oil companies for 
their part in global warming that contributed to Hurricane Katrina-
related damages.284 District Judge Senter expressed strong reservations 
about the viability of that argument, saying that: 
[T]here exists a sharp difference of opinion in the scientific 
community concerning the causes of global warming, and I 
foresee daunting evidentiary problems for anyone who under-
takes to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the de-
gree to which global warming is caused by the emission of 
greenhouse gasses; the degree to which the actions of any in-
dividual oil company, any individual chemical company, or 
the collective action of these corporations contribute, through 
the emission of greenhouse gasses, to global warming; and the 
extent to which the emission of greenhouse gasses by these 
defendants, through the phenomenon of global warming, in-
tensified or otherwise affected the weather system that pro-
duced Hurricane Katrina.285 
Even if there is a causation issue, most suits would revolve around ac-
tion in response to the disaster, and not that the defendant caused the 
disaster by his actions.286 
 Given the hurdles that this claim would face in a court of law, 
there are other legal approaches to this issue of a State’s duty in the 
midst of worsening natural disasters.287 Although the United Nations 
has declined to include a duty to protect from natural disasters as part 
of a crime against humanity, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights released a report that said, in part, “irrespective of 
whether or not climate change effects can be construed as human 
rights violations, human rights obligations provide important protec-
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tion to the individuals whose rights are affected by climate change.”288 
The report highlights the duties owed by States to protect their citi-
zenry from threats to human rights even when they are not directly re-
sponsible for them.289 
C. Looming Legal Liability Chills the Scientific Community 
 In the aftermath of the Italian conviction, the global scientific 
community reacted in outrage, and scientists throughout Italy swiftly 
turned in their resignations.290 Earthquake experts say the Italian 
court’s 2009 verdict is “likely to send a chill through the global scien-
tific community.”291 Canadian earthquake expert Gail Atkinson called 
it “a travesty,” and added, “I think that, unfortunately, what it will result 
in is seismologists and other scientists being afraid to say anything at 
all.”292 Even further, an editorial in the journal Nature declared that 
the “verdict is perverse and the sentence ludicrous.”293 In fact, within 
days of the verdict’s announcement, four top Italian disaster experts 
quit their jobs, saying the ruling will make it “impossible for them to 
perform their duties.”294 
 The reaction has been felt even beyond the reaches of Italy.295 
John Clague, a professor of earth science at Simon Fraser University, 
commented that, “scientists are going to be reluctant to deal with the 
problem, particularly government scientists . . . academics like myself, 
we’re going to be very guarded about the words we use [to talk about 
seismic activity.]”296 Even though Clague admits that the Italian scien-
tists did a weak job communicating the risks of the tremors to the citi-
zens of L’Aquila, he questions how effective a more serious warning 
would have been.297 “What if they had said that, within a week, there 
might be a devastating earthquake? Would it have changed public be-
havior? I doubt it, because you can’t predict these things with any cer-
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tainty at all . . . that would have just put people in a more anxious 
state.”298 
 In fact, Italian law recognizes the crime of “unnecessarily causing 
alarm.”299 In the weeks before the earthquake, Giampaolo Giuliani, a 
scientific technician working near L’Aquila, predicted an earthquake 
based on data he collected that pinpointed another town in Abruzzo.300 
He warned the mayor of Sulmona, a city situated only 50km from 
L'Aquila, and the mayor took the alert seriously enough to send vans 
equipped with loudspeakers around the town to warn citizens.301 This 
technique quickly created panic and the police issued Giuliani a gag-
ging injunction.302 Given this incident, there seems to exist a very thin 
line then between being gagged and forced to refrain from warning 
because it would cause alarm, and not giving adequate warning.303 
 Scientists across the globe feel that Italian courts prosecuted these 
officials for simply telling the truth and the court overlooked the reality 
that science, by nature, involves uncertainty.304 It is impossible to fully 
protect people from natural disasters, no matter the warnings or the 
preparation, even if “we stay locked in our homes.”305 Instead, it is just 
“the job of scientists to help the public and governments assess risks as 
accurately as possible so that they can take appropriate actions.”306 
D. An Alternative Approach to Natural Disaster Management  
and Survivor Grievances 
 Countries across the world can build upon already established out-
of-court means to address victim grievances.307 First, the international 
community should directly foster a dialogue to define a state’s duty in 
the wake of worsening natural disasters, and second, they should in-
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crease and build upon an already established practice of victim relief 
compensation funds.308 
 The United Nations took the warnings of the 1990 report concern-
ing the status of climate change published by the IPCC, and responded 
by organizing the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.309 The 
“Earth Summit” sought to help governments come to grips with this 
problem, and make a sustainable plan for addressing it.310 The “wide-
ranging blueprint for action” can and should be used as a model for a 
domestic and international meeting on the issue of natural disaster 
preparation, protection and mitigation.311 Even if the result is a non-
binding agreement similar to that of Agenda 21, the international 
community will take a stand on whether or not a nation has a duty to 
protect, carve out a means to hold a nation responsible, create avenues 
to legal action, and create a sustainable plan to deal with the future of 
impending natural disasters.312 
 In the aftermath of disasters, many States across the globe set up 
victim compensation funds to help citizens rebuild.313 Similar accounts 
and administrative processes have been established in the aftermath of 
September 11th 2001 and for crime victims.314 There have even been 
donation-based funds successfully set up in the aftermath of the Boston 
Marathon Bombings.315 These funds often include an administrative 
opportunity to be heard and file a grievance without bringing suits in a 
court of law, which immunity often bars donees from doing.316 
Whether a government puts money aside for such claims or, on the 
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other hand, is found liable and pays the judgment through taxpayer 
money—the money ultimately comes from the same place.317 
 Compensating victims without the need for court proceedings is 
aligned with the policy behind sovereign immunity, the idea that it is 
not in the best interest of a country to open itself up to an endless flow 
of legal suits and precedent.318 Whatever the best solution is, it is un-
doubtedly clear that natural disasters are no longer a rare occurrence 
and it is in the best interest of states to define their duty and  create a 
due process standard for victim grievances.319 
Conclusion 
 Natural disaster law has rapidly moved to the forefront of national 
consciousness as people around the world face disaster after disaster of 
historic proportion. Citizens undoubtedly feel that their government 
should protect them by preparing, warning and mitigating natural dis-
aster damages when they have taken their toll. Even so, there is no 
clearly defined legal duty established under domestic or international 
law. Citizens of the U.S. Gulf Region after Hurricane Katrina and the 
Office of the Prosecutor in L’Aquila Italy have set a significant prece-
dent by bringing these legal actions to fruition. Legal theorists and 
humanitarian groups have spoken out against the injustices following 
the Cyclone in Myanmar with less success. Nevertheless, even given this 
precedent, natural disaster litigation faces practical and policy con-
cerns. There is a balance between holding nations responsible for fail-
ing to prepare, warn of, and mitigate natural disaster damages. Unpro-
tected citizens should have an avenue for legal suit. On the other hand, 
a nation might not be able to keep up with worsening natural disasters 
and the flood of litigation that will follow any disaster. Perhaps the bet-
ter solution is to create a global dialogue and summit on the expecta-
tions, legal remedies and a way to enhance victim compensation funds 
to remedy claims out of a courtroom. 
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